The question has arisen as to whether I would object to commenters engaging in a dialogue in the comment section which dialogue is not directly related to the post in question. This is a fine tradition in the blogosphere, and I encourage it within reason (so arrange your wild outings with each other in a different forum, and remember that sensitive me will be hurt if y'all don't on occasion comment on the post in question).
A question has also arisen as to whether I know the commenters personally and how do I know them. My policy is to preserve the privacy of the commenters. If you want to give out any personal information about yourself, however, feel free to do so by posting a comment about yourself (once again, please use common sense; you really don't have to tell us about your twelve hour binge at the casino slots). You may if you wish let people in on how you know me (leaving out any information that would attract the attention of US Attorneys, of course).
Finally, I realize that there have been formatting malfunctions in some of the posts. As I undertake the quest for self-knowledge, I also undertake the perhaps more daunting task of becoming a blog formatting maven. Please be patient with me in both journeys.
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4 comments:
The quest for self-knowledge involves the eternal dance between reason and revelation. Thus, forbearance, you are not off topic.
That was my error, I misread the original post. I thought it was talking about previous comments which had gone off-topic, which I confess that some of my comments may have gone off on tangents. I realize now that it was a question about whether *in the future* comments would be allowed to go off-topic.
I miss reading your blog! To pump life back into it, I'm posting a precis I wrote for my class "Ethics for Political Animals":
In "Primates and Philosophers", de Waal defends the human species’ inherently social nature, Aristotle’s zoon politikon. Social contract theorists have explained morality as a veneer over our violent animal instincts; humans make a rational choice to suppress their bestial tendencies for the sake of civil society. De Waal refutes this philosophical tradition with evidence from primatology and human psychology. Findings suggest that we are an obligatorily gregarious species, social and cooperative by evolution. Veneer theory, though advocated by many respected evolutionists, contains a glaring paradox. It provides no mechanism for how we form moral systems in spite of our genetic wiring.
De Waal invokes primate reciprocity as evidence against veneer theory. While mutualism explains moral actions that are immediately beneficial to the involved parties, reciprocity refers to good behavior for which there is a delayed reward. The ability of primates to behave well without instant gratification undermines veneer theory’s claim that only humans can overcome selfish tendencies. Furthermore, De Waal objects to veneer theory’s claim that our genes are selfish. For an act to be selfish, there must be self-serving intent. Our genes perpetuate themselves but lack intent. Thus, human beings cannot be described as selfish solely on account of their genes.
While veneer theory has an all or nothing conception of morality, De Waal presents a Russian doll model that acknowledges degrees of empathy across species. His is a three-tiered system. The innermost shell is the “emotional contagion”— how an animal’s behavior prompts an emotional affect in another. The second shell is empathy— sympathy or personal distress over the suffering of others. The outermost shell, altruism, is observed only in social animals.
The Russia doll model is a bottom-up explanation that allows consistent development from obligatory mammalian parental care to human morality. Culture and language, higher order moral functions, can shape lower order expressions of empathy. But de Waal believes that fear of anthropomorphism has led scientists and philosophers to overlook the evolutionary continuity of empathetic behavior.
De Waal argues that fear of anthropomorphism is also behind intellectuals’ unwillingness to recognize Theory of Mind in apes. Behavioral observations of apes show targeted helping and consolation behavior, which require a high degree of self-awareness. According, apes are the only creatures besides humans who pass mirror self-recognition tasks. Yet even other primates recognize reciprocity and fairness. Chimpanzees show gratitude, sharing food with those who have groomed them most. Capuchin monkeys will stop participating in experiments if other monkeys receive more food for equal effort.
De Waal explains that morality first developed as an “in-group phenomena”, extending only to kin. Group solidarity, often in response to outsider threat, led to community concern. What separates human moral systems from primate morality is the extension of benevolent behavior to outsiders.
Neuroscientists are now discovering that we make moral judgments on emotional instinct, and rationalize after the fact (and so our revulsion to “trolley problems”). As other animals possess degrees of empathetic capacity, it makes sense to speak in terms of evolutionary morality. De Waal defends anthropomorphism as a heuristic tool. If we observe similar behavior between species, we should invoke the simplest explanation— evolutionary parsimony.
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